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The Impact of Foreign Remittances on Poverty in Nepal: A Panel Study of Household
Survey Data, 1996-2011*
Abstract
Using data from the longitudinal panel surveys of 1996, 2004, and 2011, this paper examines the
dynamics of foreign remittances and their impact on poverty in Nepal. The intent is to explore
how foreign remittances have evolved and impacted poverty and economic well-being of
households. Focusing on a consistent set of households across the three survey rounds in a
balanced panel format helps examine the effect of foreign remittances with appropriate controls.
Results from methodologically consistent, random-effects regressions that correct for potential
attrition and heterogeneity bias support significant poverty-reducing and, more accurately,
economic well-being-enhancing effects of foreign remittances especially when originating in
countries other than India. This and other findings are valuable to the assessment of policies on
utilizing foreign labor migration and remittances as a vehicle to reduce poverty in Nepal.
Keywords: Foreign remittance, poverty, economic well-being, Nepal, panel data.
JEL Codes: I3; J1; J6; R2.
I. Introduction
Nepal has experienced a rapid growth in foreign labor migration and remittances during the past
two decades. The number of migrant workers employed abroad has increased tremendously, with
thousands of unemployed youth leaving the country every day.1 Not every migrant worker
becomes successful in finding employment as promised or expected neither does every migrant
worker remit money back home. But foreign employment has been encouraged by the
government even as an active labor market strategy with remittances evolving as a major source
of income for households, communities, and the nation today. The size of foreign remittance
income relative to gross domestic product of Nepal increased from one percent in 1995 to close
to almost one-third by 2015 (World Bank, 2017). While money received in foreign remittance is
sure to improve household economic well-being, to what extent this has occurred and whether or
not this effect has changed over time are valid policy questions to answer for a country
increasingly reliant on it.
This paper explores how foreign remittances impact poverty among recipient households by
using panel data from the 1996, 2004, and 2011 rounds of the Nepal Living Standard Survey
* Authors acknowledge the valuable feedback received from two anonymous reviewers, which has helped to
improve the paper greatly. The data for this analysis come from the Nepal Living Standard Surveys (crosssectional file for 1996 and panel files for 2004 and 2011) of Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics (cbs.gov.np).
Data analysis codes (in Stata) are available from the authors.
1 According to a government report, the absentee population—defined as living away from Nepal for at least
six months—increased by 150 percent since 2001 to close to two million in 2011 (Ministry of Foreign
Employment, 2014). While not all of this amounts to foreign labor migration, this report also finds that the
Government of Nepal issued almost one-half of a million permits for foreign employment in 2013/2014 alone,
a figure more than twice that for 2008/2009.
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(NLSS). The goal is to provide insights into how poverty statuses and levels have changed
among households during the period and how foreign remittances are linked with such changes
in household poverty. While most studies of poverty in Nepal have been either qualitative or
cross-sectional, this analysis expands the coverage of survey-based analyses like those of
Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez (2012), Bhatta and Sharma (2006), Loskhin, Bontch-Osmolovski,
and Glinskaya (2007), and Wagle (2012) to a panel and longitudinal analysis covering a period
of 15 years. Given that foreign labor migration occurs more systematically than randomly,
appropriate research strategies and controls are applied to mitigate the potential endogeneity and
self-selection bias. Findings will be valuable to understand how households are participating in
foreign labor migration and benefiting from remittances to improve economic well-being and
reduce poverty, an experience widely shared across many developing countries today.
II. Literature Review
Foreign labor migration and remittances provide monetary as well as nonmonetary benefits to
recipient countries, communities, and households. Most directly, there is ample research to
support that they help improve the economic well-being of recipient families and reduce poverty
(Adams, 2005; Adams, Cuecuecha, & Page, 2008; Gustafsson & Makonnen, 1993; Du, Park, &
Wang, 2005). How remittance affects household well-being, however, depends on who sends
workers for foreign labor migration in the first place. Theoretically speaking, sending workers
for foreign employment is a household strategy to maximize economic gains and diversify
sources of income (Ellis, 2003; Rakodi & Lloyed-Jones, 2002; Thieme & Wyss, 2005; VargasLundius, Lanly, Villarreal, & Osorio, 2008). The widely known push and pull factors of
migration necessarily enter the equation with a lack of opportunities allowing households to send
their members for foreign employment (IOM, 2010; Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci,
Pellegrino, & Taylor, 1998). The economics of labor migration postulates that the decision to
seek foreign employment depends on the rational calculation of risks and benefits (Stark, 1991;
Stark & Bloom, 1985).
Household members make the decision to seek foreign employment collectively since the
payoffs go to the entire households. This notion of collective decision applies to almost all cases
of migration as the necessary preparation requires significant investment of time, energy, and
resources. To what extent one has access to information on the process of migration as well as
other networks and social contacts needed to succeed during and after migration are also
important (MMN & AMC, 2012; Thieme, 2006; Wagle, 2012). Migrant workers often go
through complicated legal processes both at home and in destination countries, with illegal
migrants facing more daunting challenges in travel, at work, and in daily lives (MMN & AMC,
2012; Mon, 2010; Brees, 2008). Given that the degree of preparation and investment increases
with the expected payoffs, households with poor, rural, and illiterate backgrounds often cannot
afford to send their members to countries or regions that offer higher employment payoffs
(Cohen, 2005; de Haan, 1997; Latapi, 2012; Wagle, 2012). Because the extent to which the poor
participate in foreign labor migration and remittances depends on maturity of the migration
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process, the history of labor migration affects the way benefits of remittance reach the poor.
Wagle’s (2012) study shows that the benefits of foreign migration and remittances may go
disproportionately to those with significant financial assets.
There is no denying that remittance incomes increase the purchasing power and help improve
the economic security of recipient households. A growing body of research focusing on microdata supports the livelihood strategy hypothesis in that the most fundamental reason that
households send their members for foreign labor migration is because they can remit money to
support the members at home (Adamsn, 2005, 2011; Adams et al., 2008; Du et al., 2005;
Gustafsson & Makonnen, 1993; Kageyama, 2008). While research conducted by Airola (2007)
in Mexico shows the share of food in total consumption to be significantly lower and that of
durables, health, and housing to be significantly higher among households with remittance, this
is also a sign that remittance helps increase expenditures in basic necessities especially for
nonfood consumption. The increased income from remittance is also shown to provide important
safety net and to reduce food insecurity, something that remains precarious in much of the least
developed world including Nepal (Cohen, 2005; Lacroix, 2011).
A large body of studies using micro and macro data also supports this poverty-reducing effect
of foreign remittance. Adams (2011) and UNCTAD (2011), for example, have found a 10
percent increase in foreign remittance to reduce poverty by up to four percent. Even when
remittances are not large enough to lift households out of poverty, they help lessen the degree of
poverty experienced (Vargas-Silva, Jha, & Sugiyarto, 2009; Wagle, 2016). Focusing on the
NLSS survey data from Nepal, Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez (2012) find that remittances
decreased poverty headcount ratios by between two and eight percent during 1996 and 2004,
with even larger reductions in the depth of poverty. Lokshin et al. (2010) also show that
migration (internal and foreign) helped reduce poverty by almost 20 percent between 1995 and
2004 in Nepal. Although the specific observation depends on the timeframe as well as other
forms of reference—poverty definition and internal vs. foreign remittance, for example—it is
almost unequivocal that remittances have had important poverty-reducing effects in Nepal.
How significant is this poverty reducing impact of remittance? The poverty reducing impact
can sustain longer only if households manage to invest in business, agriculture, or other income
generating activities. For one, the very high rates of expenditures (up to 90 percent) in basic
necessities out of remittance money undermine any investment prospects (Airola, 2007; Turnell,
Vickary, & Bradford, 2008). While a comprehensive review of literature on the role of
remittance conducted by de Haas (2007) in Mexico points to an important multiplier effect of
increased consumption spurred by remittance at a broader level, there is no more than anecdotal
evidence that remittance money has been put to productive use especially by households that are
concerned with making daily ends meet. Similarly, the value added that remittance provides to
poverty reduction must heed the possible displacement of existing economic activities by
household members once they start receiving remittance (Adams, 2011; Latapi, 2012). Although
remittance receiving families may witness increased incomes and consumption, Wagle’s (2016)
study from Myanmar shows that the role of remittances on economic security may be more

3

limited when household characteristics relevant to determining labor migration and remittances
are fully controlled. The real distinction may be in terms of the short-term versus long-term
benefits of remittances, the latter of which are not easy to track through household surveys.
III. Hypotheses and Data
Exploring the impact of foreign remittances on poverty is highly challenging to say the least.
Directly, the additional monetary resources received in remittance would help increase
household incomes and consumption and reduce poverty. This suggests that foreign remittance
would have significant positive impact on income or consumption and a significant negative
impact on poverty. This does not mean, however, that remittances come without cost. Given the
necessity of financial and nonfinancial investment to make foreign labor migration a reality, for
example, the resource base may be significantly drained when households decide to send
members for foreign labor migration. In some cases, emigration of some members also means
that households receiving foreign remittance may cut down on their income generating activities
at home. The flip side can be that households are able to invest the extra resources from
remittance on activities that generate further returns especially when we consider a longer time
span. But the most fundamental impact of labor migration is that the emigrating member’s
potential to generate income at home, otherwise known as the opportunity cost, would be
necessarily lost as a result of migration. While the poverty-reducing hypothesis of foreign
remittance still holds since the payoff of foreign employment can be significantly higher than
what would be possible otherwise, this complexity suggests that the outcomes can be quite
different when multiple factors are incorporated. To the extent that these opportunity costs can
be incorporated, the hypothesis of poverty-reducing effects of remittances may not fully hold.
This is also precisely the issue this analysis explores more fully in the temporal context of Nepal.
The data for this analysis come from three rounds of the Nepal Living Standard Survey
(NLSS): 1996, 2004, and 2011. While the typical usage of NLSS data has focused on the close to
3,000 households included in its independent, cross-sectional samples, the focus here is on the
panel version. To clarify, data come from the 1996 cross-sectional survey of over 3,000
households (there was no separate panel sample in this first round), followed by samples of about
1,000 each from the 2004 and 2011 rounds. A total of 752 households from the 1996 sample
were interviewed in 2004 and a total of 780 households interviewed in 2011 came from the 1996
or 2004 samples. But only 434 households were tracked consistently across the first, second, and
third rounds of the survey, making this the effective sample size for the balanced panel analysis.2
Given that the balanced panel yields a sample size that is significantly smaller (58 percent of
those interviewed in 1996 and 20043), a side-by-side comparison of results using the full panel
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Additional notes on the sampling design and its representation are provided in YYY (XXXX). The Central
Bureau of Statistics that is responsible for designing and conducting these surveys provides reports and
publications on the data and technical issues (CBS, 1996, 2004, 2011a).
3 Since the 1996 cross-sectional sample was used as the starting point for the 2004 sample, computing attrition
from the 1996 sample does not make complete sense. It is also noteworthy that the panel of households is
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samples is also presented, when appropriate.
Data are also needed on foreign remittances, poverty, and other relevant characteristics of
households as well as household heads (or simply “householders”). Foreign remittances are
measured in terms of the presence or absence as well as the value of cash or non-cash receipts
from foreign countries with further breakdown into India and others as the source countries.
Poverty is measured in terms of poverty status as well as the poverty or, more precisely, nonpoverty level of households by comparing their consumption expenditures relative to the
applicable nationally defined poverty lines, detailed by geographies and household sizes for the
given years.4 Household and householder characteristics including geography, education,
occupation, and other demographics are used to enrich the analysis by helping to predict the
status and level of poverty more accurately.
IV. Changing Remittance Rates
Data summarized in Table 1 indicate that slightly over 10 percent of the sampled panel
households had foreign remittances in 1996, with this number remaining virtually unchanged by
2004. But interestingly, this number declined, quite significantly, to under five percent by 2011.
These numbers are also consistent between the panel and balanced panel data, with the latter
focusing on the same 434 households surveyed across all three episodes. The only exception is
2004 in which the remittance rate for the balanced panel declined by about two percentage
points. What is interesting is the source of this foreign remittance with nine out of 10 households
receiving remittance from India in 1996, which ratio declined quite drastically to three out of 10
by 2004. By 2011, however, this ratio increased to over six out of 10 even though the actual rate
of remittance was more than halved from that of 2004.
(Table 1)
It is important to remember that these remittance rates do not fully capture the rate of foreign
labor migration which is growing enormously in Nepal. For one, some of these households
receive remittance from multiple members whereas some labor migrants may not remit money at
all. These data are also not fully comparable with other findings which show growing rates of
foreign remittance in Nepal. While the data used for 1996 are identical, the almost 18 percent
rate of foreign remittance found by Wagle (2012) emanates from the cross-sectional sample of
formed from the raw data for each survey year by merging records of all members with the given unique
household identifiers, without any attention to the potential splits, mergers, or other structural circumstances.
4 This involves aggregating different categories of expenditure including for food, house rental, utilities, and
other nonfood items (using the standard 30-day recall period) at the household level. Food items include food
consumption through purchase, in-kind receipts, or home-grown produce. Non-food items also have similar
sub-categories. Owner occupied housing signifies the value of house rental or forgone income. Other
expenditure items including education and health care are not included because of the complexities in their
valuation as some of it is received publicly whereas others are purchased in the private market. While this
analysis does not fully replicate the computations of the CBS (1996, 2004, 2011a), estimates are somewhat
comparable and internally consistent. See YYY (XXX) for detailed comparison of the computations and their
results.
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the 2004 survey. Even more importantly, the fact that households with foreign remittance are
likely to move either to urban areas or even internationally makes it challenging to obtain panel
samples for over a decade that is fully representative in terms of their labor migration. As
important as maintaining representative samples is the ability to track the consistent of set of
households in terms of their patterns in labor migration and remittances (as well as poverty).
But what is the pattern of foreign remittances among the sampled households? Figure 1 shows
that the rate of foreign remittance among the 434 households included in the balanced sample
has declined consistently over time. Whereas 90 percent of the households did not receive
foreign remittance in 1996, only 10 percent of them received it in 2004. Of this smaller group,
moreover, none received remittance about seven years later. While six percent of the households
without foreign remittance in 2004 did receive it in 2011, this as well as the zero rate of
remittance in both 2004 and 2011 among households receiving remittance in 1996 help explain
how foreign remittance may have indirectly caused many households to be out of the panel
sample.
(Figure 1)
V. Poverty Incidence and Its Interface with Remittance
Table 2 presents the estimates of poverty for households and their changes over time using the
full as well as balanced panel samples. Data from the full panel suggest that over 58 percent of
the households were in poverty in 1996 with this figure declining by 20 percentage points by
2004 and yet increasing by another six percentage points by 2011. While the combined poverty
rate stands at over 55 percent for the entire period, this is bit deceptive because of its bias toward
the much higher rate applicable to 1996 with over 3,000 households. The specific methodology
applied to compute household consumption can lead to very different poverty estimates as well.5
What is clear, however, is that almost one-half of the population may still be living in poverty
despite significant declines shown by many reports and publications.
(Table 2)
Estimates from the balanced panel of 434 households show somewhat lower rates of poverty
especially for 2004, with the overall poverty rates declining to just over 41 percent given the
exact weighting of data across the three surveys. Since households included in the panel samples
vary over time, the message from the estimates focusing on the balanced panel is that poverty
incidence has indeed fluctuated across the three survey years with significantly lower incidence
in 2004. While the use of revised poverty lines for 2011 may have resulted in a slight increase in
poverty incidence for 2011 (CBS, 2011b), it is fair to conclude that reducing poverty has been an
enduring policy challenge in Nepal.
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The cross-sectional version of the NLSS data have shown that poverty headcount ratio declined from 42 per
cent in 1996 to 31 per cent in 2005 and then to 25 per cent in 2011 (CBS, 2011b). The magnitude as well as the
temporal decline also vary depending on the specific methodology, with some reports showing the poverty
rates of 35 and 33 percent for 1996 and 2004 respectively (Bhatta & Sharma, 2006).
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Table 2 also provides estimates useful to link poverty with foreign remittance. Before getting
into that, however, it is important to observe the changing poverty spells among the 434
households included in the balanced panel across the three survey years. Figure 2 shows that, of
the 58 percent that were poor in 1996, 42 percent remained poor whereas the remaining 58
percent exited from poverty. Of those exiting the poverty spell in 2004, however, about 42
percent descended into poverty again whereas 58 percent remained non-poor. This breakdown
flips among households that remained poor in 1996 as well as 2004, with 60 percent of them still
poor by 2011. The rate of poverty is much lower at 21 percent among households that were
found to be poor in 1996. While households that were consistently non-poor in 1996 and 2004
had slightly higher poverty rates (27 percent) in 2011, 43 percent of those who descended into
poverty by 2004 were stuck there as of 2011 as well. This description paints a picture of longerterm, structural, and perhaps intergenerational poverty in which current poverty status largely
determines the poverty status at some future date (Carter & Barrett, 2006). But this also supports
the transient nature of poverty in which there is at least 20 percent chance that even the non-poor
households enter into poverty later in life (YYY: XXXX).
(Figure 2)
To come back to the link of poverty with foreign remittance status, Table 2 makes it clear that
poverty rates are almost indistinguishable between households with or without remittance as well
as across the different source countries. To be precise, there are observable differences with
households with foreign remittance especially from India experiencing significantly greater
poverty rates in general as well as in 1996. But this poverty increasing-impact or link of foreign
remittance flipped by 2004, which by 2011 became either indistinguishable (for the full panel
sample) or reverted almost to the levels of 1996 (for the balanced panel sample). A positive way
of interpreting this is to suggest a lack of evidence to link poverty with remittances, which may
in part have resulted from a small rate of remittance recipiency (<11%). This may also mean,
however, that it is the relatively poorer households that tend to participate in foreign labor
migration which does not always deliver its promise of large payoffs especially in case of
seasonal jobs in India (Thieme, 2006; Wagle, 2012).
(Table 2)
How do these poverty rates vary in relation to foreign remittances temporally? Table 3
presents a two-way interface of the poverty and foreign remittance status for all three survey
years. Over 24 percent of the households were never poor whereas over 77 percent of the
households never received foreign remittance. At the opposite end of the spectrum were close to
15 percent of the households that were poor across all three episodes even though their foreign
remittance status varied. While the primary motivation in this paper was to identify who has
always been poor and/or received remittance, none of the households included in the survey was
actually a repeat remittance recipient—meaning that the latter two surveys exhibit complete
attrition of households receiving foreign remittance at an earlier period.6 But the fact that the
6

The sample is seemingly biased with respect to the status on foreign remittance, owing perhaps to the
apparent reason that all of the remittance receiving households moved and thus were not captured in the
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balanced panel samples can be divided into those that never received remittance (77%) and those
that received remittance in different years—1996 (10%), 2004 (9%), and 2011 (4%)—is still
useful because their poverty status can be examined further. Of the households without foreign
remittance, for example, 16 percent were always poor, 25 percent were never poor, 33 percent
were poor during only one survey year, and 26 percent were poor during two of the three survey
years. Of those with foreign remittance, moreover, 11 percent were always poor, 21 percent were
never poor, 32 percent were poor during one survey year, and 35 percent were poor during two
of the three survey years. While the rates of poverty varied across survey years, the prime take
away from this exercise is that those without remittance tended to exhibit persistently higher
poverty spells and yet significantly lower rates of poverty across two of the three survey years.
(Table 3)
It is important to remember that none of this discussion focuses on differences in the degree or
severity of poverty experienced across households without or with foreign remittance. Figure 3
displays the median non-poverty levels7 for the poor and non-poor across the two groups of
households as generated from the full panel and the balanced panel. Admittedly, these profiles
are highly aggregated and rudimentary given that the data come from three survey years only.
These may also be less consistent for non-poor households especially when they are generated
from the full and more heterogeneous panel samples, which include a combination of highly
diverse cases even though the median non-poverty level is expected to claim some stability. But
the profiles are so consistent on the side of poor households that the median poverty level among
households with remittance actually improved, even surpassing those of the poor, non-remittance
recipient households by 2004 and especially 2011. While the median non-poverty levels of nonpoor households changed more drastically especially in case of the larger panel samples, there is
still evidence that remittance receiving households witnessed even more drastic improvement in
their median consumption levels. Starting with much lower levels of consumption than their
counterparts without remittance in 1996, household remittance proved to be highly beneficial
over time.
(Figure 3)

VI. The Model

following surveys. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the samples were biased because the
representativeness was maintained in other respects by adding other households (CBS, 2011a). YYY (XXXX)
provides further examination of the representativeness of the samples using similar panel data.
7 This is measured as consumption relative to the household need expressed in the applicable poverty line so
that higher values indicate better off positions for both poor and non-poor households. For example, the value
of 90 signifies a 10 percent shortfall of consumption whereas a value of 190 signifies a 90 percent surplus (or
better off position) of consumption. Overall, this can be interpreted as consumption as a percentage of the
poverty or non-poverty level.
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While the above two-way analysis is insightful, a multivariate model of poverty is needed to
examine the specific role of remittance vis-a-vis those of other important household
characteristics that collectively determine the production function of poverty and economic wellbeing of households. The generic production function of poverty or economic well-being, Y,
takes the following form:
…
…
…
(1)
Yit =  0 + 1 xit +  2 zit +  it
Where X represents remittance; z represents the vector of geography, human capital, and other
household characteristics; and i and t represent households and years of survey respectively.
Household characteristics making up the composition of households as well as key demographic
features of householders signify an important element of the production function as they
determine both capacity and need of households to engage in various economic activities. The
theoretically significant aspects of these household characteristics include such sociodemographic features as caste and ethnicity as well as household size, number of members under
18, and gender, age, and marital status of householders (YYY, XXXX; World Bank & DFID,
2005; World Bank, DFID, & ADB, 2006). Prime indicators of human capital with theoretically
strong predictive powers for poverty and economic well-being include education and occupation
especially of householders (Bhatta & Sharma 2006; Karki & Bohara 2014; Wagle 2015). Given
that households derive an important part of economic well-being from their endowments,
household property8 is also an integral element of the household characteristics (Carter &
Barrett, 2006; Carter & May, 2001; YYY, XXXX). Furthermore, geographic features including
urban/rural locations as well as regions and ecological belts either facilitate or constrain the
productive capacity of households to derive economic well-being and poverty (Cohen, 2005;
Latapi, 2012; Wagle, 2012).
More focal to this analysis, however, are the roles of foreign remittances in determining
poverty after controlling for the above factors. Remittances can have different forms of
measurement including their presence and magnitudes with further breakdowns by the source
country especially in reference to India versus other third countries. Given that economic wellbeing can be more accurately characterized in terms of poverty status as well as the level of nonpoverty (or poverty if the measure is under 100), different versions of this production function
will be estimated.
The issue of sample size is also important as it affects the specific methodology applied to
estimate this generic model. It is noteworthy that the full panel samples have much wider
coverage from which balanced panel samples are created. To be consistent with the motivation
of examining the role of remittance on poverty over time, however, this part of the analysis
focuses on data from the balanced panel only. While the sample size would be more limited and
the data do not include households receiving remittances during multiple survey years,9 the
8

This includes all forms of assets with value such as land, houses or buildings, durable goods and equipment, net
worth of businesses, livestock, and other cash and non-cash holdings.
9

Important to keep in mind is that this would not be any different in case of the full panel samples since the
additional households do not even repeat.
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balanced panel still allows proper examination of multiple poverty spells to address some of the
potential endogeneity problems inherent in situations like this10 (Adams, 2011). Even in terms of
the representativeness of different population groups, the balanced panel households are not
significantly different from the larger panel households in the rates of poverty and remittances.
Although Janajatis, urban locations, Hills and Terai areas, and households with older, male
householders have somewhat lower representation (YYY, XXXX), the fact that this applies
mostly to the 2011 survey introducing a large number (over 50%) of new households, suggests
that the population dynamics may have also changed over time.
Methodologically, since the data include time-varying measures of household characteristics,
the potentially “more consistent” fixed-effects panel data regressions would throw away
information that would be helpful to explore rival explanations. Many of these time-invariant
variables including caste and ethnicity, urban locations, Hills and Terai areas, and development
regions are also shown to exert significant impact on economic well-being and poverty in Nepal
as well as elsewhere (Bhatta & Sharma, 2006; Cohen, 2005; Karki & Bohara, 2014; Latapi,
2012; Wagle, 2015; World Bank & DFID, 2005; YYY, XXXX). While the choice of fixed
versus random effects regressions is typically settled empirically (for example, by using
Houseman tests), Bell and Jones (2015) and Wooldridge (2009) suggest this to be directly linked
with the purpose of analysis with the random effects regressions incorporating more detailed
information. This analysis therefore focuses on the random effects regressions of poverty status
(Logistic) as well as non-poverty levels. The goal here is to ascertain the extent to which foreign
remittances play a role in determining the poverty status or level among households after
controlling for a comprehensive set of household characteristics. But this approach, in and of
itself, does not fully account for the potential self-selection and attrition bias even while using
random survey data. Because households continuing into the panel samples as well as those
receiving foreign remittance are self-selected depending on a variety of reasons that go beyond
what can be captured in these data, the assumption of equal probability sampling and exogeneity
of remittance may not fully hold (Adams, 2011).
Two separate strategies are adopted to address these concerns. The first involves weighting
random effects models by the “inverse probability” of attrition following the approach developed
and applied by Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998) based on the work by Becketti, Gould,
Lillard, and Welch (1988). While the bias resulting from attrition of over 40 percent of the
households cannot be removed in its entirety, this adjustment is useful to compare results across
different model variations by mitigating the bias associated with a potential for systematic
attrition. Operationally, this process requires creating a weighting factor from the predicted
probabilities of attrition between the unrestricted and restricted models:
Ai =  0 +  1 xit +  2 zit + vi …
…
…
(2)

10

An alternative to the balanced panel analysis would be an unbalanced panel analysis expanding the sample size
quite significantly (1,304 vs. 5,369). But this is not pursued since, in addition to expanding the length of the paper
substantially, this alternative would have biased the results toward the “attriters” or “new panel entrants,” effectively
moving the analysis and findings away from its central premise.
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Ai* =  0 + 1 xit + ei

…

…

…

(3)

Where, Ai =1 if the household is an attriter and 0 otherwise; x is the vector of core explanatory
variables including presence of remittance, consumption per capita, and property-holding per
capita; and z is the vector of auxiliary, and typically demographic, variables. The weighting
factor, Wi, then is the ratio of the predicted probabilities of attrition between equations (3) and
(2) (pr/pu) estimated using Probit regression. It is also important to note that since the panel
dataset formalized in 2004 begins with 752 households interviewed in both 1996 and 2004, the
subscript t refers to 2004 (or year 2) with Ai = 1 for households interviewed in both 2007 and
2011 and 0 otherwise. The model outlined in equation (1) is then estimated with Wi as the
weighting factor (i-weight in Stata) in order to arguably remove the potential attrition bias. In
addition, equation 2 is used to ascertain the degree to which attrition bias is operational in the
balanced panel data.
Second, the models of poverty level and status apply the “within-between formulation” of Bell
and Jones (2015) in order to correct for any potential correlation between covariates and
residuals. By drawing from prior work by Mundlak (1978), Bell and Jones (2015) adjust the
random model intercepts by adding a between-effect term which helps to model the
heterogeneity bias associated with time varying covariates. Beginning with the following
unadjusted random effects operation from equation (1), the adjusted model takes the form:
…
…
(4)
Yitj = 0 + 1 ( X itj − X tj ) + 2 X tj + 3 zitj + uitj …
Where, i, t, and j represent households, years of survey, and remittance status respectively. The
group means, X tj , and the variables adjusted by group means, ( X itj− X tj ) , help separate the
between- and within-effects, without risking collinearity caused by extended heterogeneity. In
this equation, φ1 captures the impact of the temporary deviations of X from its mean (within
effect) whereas φ2 captures the impact of a permanent component of X (between effect).
Additionally, just like the fixed-effects estimator, this approach assumes there are no timevarying omitted variables that are correlated with the covariates used in the model. But it is this
ability to model higher level entities (e.g., those with or without remittance, different castes and
ethnicities, and different locations) that lead Bell and Jones (2015) to conclude in favor of using
random effects models even when a Hausman test would suggest in favor of using fixed-effects
regressions for greater consistency.
VII. Results
Table 4 presents results from the panel data Logistic regressions of poverty status. While poverty
status as the dependent variable remains unchanged, the model specifications change with regard
to the use of foreign remittances in aggregate, remittances from India, and those from countries
other than India as dichotomous variables and the amount of foreign remittance received as a
continuous variable. The models perform reasonably well with a moderate power to accurately
predict fraction of the poor and non-poor status of households. The role of household property is
consistently significant and negative as are those of education and urban areas as they help lower
the likelihood of poverty. Few other household characteristics also exhibit consistently
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significant coefficients even though their impacts on the likelihood of poverty are positive:
Janajati ethnicity, far-western region, and the number of household members under 18.
(Table 4)
The coefficients on foreign remittance are mostly insignificant with only that from countries
other than India showing significant coefficient at 90 percent confidence level. Whereas the
impact of foreign remittance measured as the presence of it as well as the actual amount received
is negative, this does not turn out to be significantly different from zero. Particularly interesting
is the insignificant and even positive association of foreign remittance from India with poverty
status since the relatively smaller amounts of remittance received from this mostly seasonal form
of labor migration may not have been large enough to significantly change the likelihood of
poverty. If anything, the presence of remittance from countries other than India may have helped
reduce poverty.
It is important to note that these results focus exclusively on poverty status, without
distinguishing the degree of non-poverty experienced by households. The results presented in
Table 5 measure the dependent variable in terms of the economic well-being of households that
are relative to the needs as operationalized in the applicable poverty line. Given that non-poverty
level has continuous measurement and the covariates include many key time-invariant variables,
this model is estimated as a random effects regression with maximum likelihood estimator in the
panel data framework. The explanatory powers of these models are not very high which is
consistent with the significance of few covariates as well. In fact, while the coefficients of some
variables, significant from the model of poverty status (Table 4), turn out to be insignificant here,
some similarities also exist especially with regard to household property and urban areas.
(Table 5)
The focus on non-poverty level helps examine the role of foreign remittance more clearly.
Whereas the coefficient of the presence of remittance from India is still insignificant, the amount
of foreign remittance as well as the presence of remittance from countries other than India have
highly significant and positive coefficients. This suggests that remittance from third countries
makes significant contributions (327% of the applicable poverty line) to increasing consumption
relative to the household need. In fact, the size of this contribution is quite substantial: having
remittance from third countries can bring household consumption from zero to well above the
applicable poverty line, with other factors held constant. This also holds true for the amount of
foreign remittance with about an additional NRs. 25,000 (or US$ 350 in 2011 exchange rate) of
remittance helping to lift an average household out of poverty. While this poverty-reducing
impact of remittance also applies to the presence of foreign remittance itself without any
distinction between India and third countries, the level of confidence declines to close to 90
percent.
The next step in the process is to continue with the random effects regressions but yet adjust
the models to address potential attrition bias. While the formal test following equation (2)
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effectively rules out the prevalence of attrition bias,11 the corrective measures proposed by
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) are adopted to address any potential issues given the relatively high rate
of attrition. Table 6 reports outcomes from the panel data models after arguably purging this
attrition bias by using the inverse probability of attrition computed following equations (2) and
(3) as the weighting factor. Results not only support the relevance of adjusting models where
high attrition remains a major issue as the model fits indicated by the measures of likelihood
ratio test improve significantly. The impacts of foreign remittance after correcting for attrition
bias also turn out to be larger and more significant across all forms of measurement. The role of
foreign remittance in particular becomes significant at a higher (95 percent) level, affording
greater confidence in rejecting the hypothesis of no association.
(Table 6)
The next set of outcomes reported in Table 7 continues with the random effects and Logistic
models of poverty but following the between-within formulation of Bell and Jones (2015) to
control for any potential correlation between covariates and residuals. To be clear, this exercise
focuses on the groups with and without remittance by year with the amount of remittance
averaged and subtracted for those with remittance across the different panel years for use with
the averages themselves to capture the within- and between-effects. While the outcomes from the
estimation of equation (4) are not highly sensitive to these adjustments, separating the impact of
foreign remittance between and within groups helps improve the model performance as well with
the percentage of poor and non-poor accurately predicted by the Logistic model increasing from
66 to 68 (result not reported). The random effects regression shows that both of the between- and
within-effects of remittance recipiency significantly affect the non-poverty level of households
with higher levels of remittance helping to increase consumption relative to the poverty line.
This poverty-reducing impact of remittance is also reaffirmed by the significant negative
coefficient of mean-differenced measures of remittance shown by the Logistic regression, even
though this result is not supported in case of between-effects.
(Table 7)
While these techniques provide an insight into how foreign remittances have directly
impacted the economic well-being and poverty status of households, they do not fully account
for the differences in economic well-being that go beyond these observable characteristics. The
opportunity cost as well as other indirect costs and benefits of foreign labor migration suggests
that regressions alone may not fully capture the impact of remittance. Particularly important is
the need to use counterfactuals across households with and without remittance so that the
impacts of foreign labor migration with respect to the relative advantages and disadvantages can
be examined. The final component of this analysis includes Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions that
apply counterfactuals or conditions of a specific group to estimate the unexplained variation that
would be attributable to belonging to the group of remittance receiving households. The idea is
11

The difference in attrition was found significant (95% level) for MCH caste and agriculture and forestry and
production occupations of householders, with differences by property holding and Hills region showing marginal
significance (90% level). More importantly, the roles of foreign remittance and household consumption were not
significant neither were any other cross-sections.
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to apply the production function regression models developed and estimated above (equation 1)
to identify the relative advantages and disadvantages of remittances in terms of the level of nonpoverty. Although the original Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) procedures were developed for
linear regressions, the technique developed by Sinning, Hahn, and Baur (2008) can be applied to
non-linear situations as well.12
Results reported in Table 8 suggest that close to 50 percent of the variations in non-poverty
level is explained by the productive characteristics or endowments included in the production
function. The difference in unexplained variations in the degree of non-poverty with the given
covariates are about one-half between households with and without foreign remittance. In fact,
this relative difference amounts to 44 percent when all sources of foreign remittance are
included, with further breakdowns into remittances received from India as well as other third
countries exhibiting this unexplained variation close to 50 percent. These results may have been
affected by very low rates of remittances, going to as low as two and one-half percent especially
for India and other third country sources. It is also noteworthy that not all of the unexplained
variation may be attributed to foreign remittances since the actual process by which economic
well-being is determined goes beyond what can be captured in the production function used here.
For example, self-selection as well as other individual factors speaking for hard-work,
motivation, and capacity to remit money can be important sources of such unexplained variation.
But the fact that remittances account for close to one-half the variations in economic well-being
speaks for the relatively large roles of foreign labor migration among households in Nepal.
(Table 8)
VIII. Discussions and Conclusion
In the context of growing foreign labor migration and remittances, this analysis offers insights
into the way foreign remittances have impacted poverty and economic well-being among
households in Nepal. The survey data used in this analysis are by no means representative of the
entire population. Whereas the panel samples that are redesigned by the CBS at every iteration of
the NLSS may not be fully representative, unlike their larger cross-sectional counterparts, the
balanced panel versions of the data yield even more limited coverage. While estimated to be
close to seven percent in 2011 (Department of Foreign Employment, 2014), the prevalence of
foreign remittances is also difficult to ascertain. But it may actually be much higher than five
percent (or lower) that is identified from the 2011 version of the data used here. This analysis
may not have fully represented the recent dynamics of foreign labor migration and remittances in
Nepal. At the same time, even though certain ethnicities are found to have higher (LCH) or lower
(MCH and Newars) rates of attrition, more uniform representation exists across other
demographic breakdowns (YYY, XXXX). The exclusive focus on the balanced panel households
consistently tracked across 1996, 2004, and 2011 causes some loss in representation with regard
to households receiving foreign remittances as they are more likely to move. The political
12

Additional complexity of applying this procedure to the panel data is addressed by using cluster-robust
standard errors by the year of survey, which albeit not ideal accounts for temporal deviations.
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instability and personal insecurity associated with the decade-long Maoist insurgency from the
mid-1990s may have also affected the self-reported estimates of consumption, remittances, and
other contextual factors analyzed here. But, on balance, this analysis focusing on the balanced
panel data provides important insights into how foreign remittances have impacted poverty and
economic well-being of households in Nepal.
Given that foreign remittances may encourage and enable households to move, their attrition
from the balanced panel supports the observation that poverty rates are higher among the
balanced panel households than among the full panel households. But this analysis finds that
foreign remittances may not necessarily have reduced poverty rates among households, with
equal or even greater rates of poverty among those with foreign remittance. The issue of attrition
can be so prevalent that the data do not include households with foreign remittance across two of
the three years surveyed, let alone across all three years. Yet, the relatively lower rates of nonpoverty among households without foreign remittance increased significantly by 2011 whereas
the lower rates of poverty among households with foreign remittance in 1996 and 2004 also
increased significantly by 2011. This creates a highly complicated picture of the interface of
foreign remittance with poverty even though the median non-poverty level improved
significantly for households with foreign remittance over time. This is consistent with the fact
that while the median value of foreign remittance increased four-folds between 1996 and 2004—
from NRs. 10,000 to NRs. 42,000 (US$ 142 to 598 in 2011 exchange rate)—it declined by 2011
almost to one-half that of 1996, resulting perhaps from the high rate of attrition among
households with foreign remittance.
But findings from the multivariate analysis largely support the poverty reducing hypotheses of
foreign remittance. To be sure, this impact specifically applies to the degree of non-poverty
measuring household consumption relative to needs as defined by the applicable poverty lines
with foreign remittances helping to improve economic well-being or reduce the degree of
poverty significantly. Moreover, even this economic well-being-enhancing impact is more
significant in case of remittances from sources other than India with the amount of foreign
remittance playing even a more consistent role. While the amount of remittance as well as the
presence of remittance especially from third countries are found to directly improve economic
well-being, this finding remains highly stable across different model specifications and
formulations including those that address the potential attrition and self-selection bias. Findings
are not very compelling in case of direct poverty-reducing impact when poverty status is treated
as a dichotomous variable, which apparently throws away the potentially useful information in
terms of the degree of non-poverty. But the between-within formulation of Bell and Jones (2015)
helps to recast this into different levels, suggesting that the actual impacts of mean-differenced
measure of remittance are significant at a very high confidence level. Furthermore, while many
unobserved variables may have been left out, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis
supports this poverty-reducing, or more accurately economic well-being-enhancing, impact of
remittances as they help explain almost one-half of the variation in non-poverty level of
households.
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Several observations stand out in terms of the contributions of this analysis. First, these
findings imply that foreign labor migration especially to countries other than India may have
been quite beneficial to improving household welfare and reducing poverty. In the context of
growing foreign labor migration with thousands of young unemployed people—particularly
men—leaving for many Gulf as well as East Asian countries,13 this analysis supports the notion
that the resulting payoffs can be beneficial for their households. This also supports the extant
policy framework of the Government of Nepal that underscores foreign labor migration as a
strategy to address mass unemployment and poverty and seeks to streamline and institutionalize
the legal process for Nepalis to seek foreign employment and emigrate (Department of Foreign
Employment, 2014). Whereas this mobility does not occur without direct or indirect costs
including significant opportunity costs (Thieme & Wyss, 2005; Wagle, 2012), the widespread
lack of employment opportunities especially in the countryside of Nepal elevates the potential
benefits relative to the costs involved. The case of India is different since the benefits of labor
migration do not turn out to be highly significant in case of this relatively low-cost, open-border
destination often providing seasonal opportunities (Thieme, 2006; Wagle 2012, 2016). But this
difference in destination countries also emanates from the capacity of households—in skills,
finances, social contacts, etc.—to send members for labor migration to industrial countries, Gulf
or East Asian countries, or India representing the potential payoff in descending order. To take
this policy implication even further, the government could emphasize human capital
development in order to cater to the need for skilled labor internationally.
Second, the findings of this analysis are generally consistent to those from the existing
research. The exclusive focus on foreign remittance as opposed to remittance in general makes
this analysis much different from many other studies (Acharya et al., 2012; CBS, 1996, 2004,
2011b; Loskhin et al., 2007; Wagle, 2012). It is also important to underscore the unique quality
of this analysis focusing on the balanced panel households out of national surveys conducted in
1996, 2004, and 2011 as it may not fully align with the findings from the cross-sectional variants
of this survey. In this sense, it would not be prudent to make sweeping claims about the specific
magnitude of the impact of foreign remittances on economic well-being or poverty. But the
conclusion that foreign labor migration—especially to countries other than India—can help
improve economic well-being or reduce poverty among participating households is very
consistent with evidence from the existing research focusing not just on Nepal but internationally
(Adams, 2005, 2011; Kageyama, 2008; UNCTAD, 2011; Wagle, 2012, 2016). Even more
important is the observation that this poverty-reducing and especially economic well-beingenhancing impact of remittances endures the test of multiple frameworks and methodological
adjustments.
Third, this analysis operationalizes two separate methodological advancements that are
increasingly embraced in the field of international development. Whereas researchers struggle
with the best way to use the increasingly rich sets of survey data, the attempt at testing and
13

Almost 1,500 per day according to some government estimates, which does not even include the easy and
undocumented migration to India (Department of Foreign Employment, 2014).
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correcting for attrition bias helps elevate the utility of data especially from panel surveys (OutesLeon & Dercon, 2008). Additionally, whereas policy-researchers using longitudinal data
typically rely on the relatively restrictive fixed-effects techniques, this analysis promotes the
utility of random-effects techniques with adjustment for heterogeneity bias (Bell & Jones, 2015)
to enrich our understanding of the ways lives are experienced.
Given major data concerns, analyses focusing on more consistent and nationally
representative data would be a more productive way forward in order to gain greater confidence
in establishing the link between foreign remittance and poverty. However, the likelihood that the
panel data provided from the NLSS will expand on the representation of different cross-sections
diminishes over time. Particularly important for studies of foreign remittances is the ability to
reduce attrition among households with migrant workers as they are likely to move. But the
Government of Nepal can make a concerted effort at developing sampling schemes that ensure
greater number of panel households.
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Figure 1, Temporal Status of Foreign Remittance among Households
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Figure 2, Temporal Status of Poverty among Households
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a. For Poor Households
Panel Sample

b. For Non-poor Households
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Remittance
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Figure 3, Median Poverty and Non-poverty Levels for HHs with and without Remittance
(Poverty or non-poverty level defined as consumption relative to applicable poverty line with
values below 100 indicating poverty and those above 100 indicating non-poverty)
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Tables
Table 1, Remittance Rates among Households
Full Panel
Balanced Panel
Remittance Rate
Remittance Rate
Year
(%)
(%)
N
N
All
All
Countries
India
Countries
India
1996
3376
10.47
9.17
432
10.14
8.99
2004
961
10.30
3.43
432
8.53
3.92
2011
1032
4.80
3.21
432
4.15
2.07

Table 2, Poverty Among Households without and with Foreign Remittance
Poverty Incidence (%)
Samples
1996
2004
2011
Combined
Panel Sample
All Households
58.40
38.29
44.28
52.10
Without foreign remittance
58.18
38.56
44.69
51.98
With foreign remittance
60.54
35.63
36.54
53.29
With remittance from India
66.55
24.14
45.16
61.10
Balanced Panel
All Households
58.29
33.18
41.71
44.39
Without foreign remittance
57.44
33.75
41.83
44.22
With foreign remittance
65.91
27.03
38.89
46.46
With remittance from India
71.79
23.53
55.56
46.92

Table 3, Poverty Status by Foreign Remittance among Balanced Panel
Households across Survey Years (Values are percentages unless otherwise
indicated)
Foreign Remittance Receiveda (%)
Poor
Never
In 1996
In 2004
In 2011
Total
Never
25.07
15.91
18.92
38.89
24.19
In 1996 only
19.40
22.73
21.62
5.56
19.35
In 2004 only
4.78
2.27
10.81
5.56
5.07
In 2011 only
9.25
6.82
10.81
0.00
8.76
In 1996 & 2004
9.55
15.91
2.70
11.11
9.68
In 1996 & 2011
13.13
15.91
21.62
22.22
14.52
In 2004 & 2011
2.99
9.09
5.41
0.00
3.69
Always
15.82
11.36
8.11
16.67
14.75
N
1,005
132
111
54
1,302
% of N
77.19
10.14
8.53
4.15
100.00
Note: a. No households with remittance at multiple points
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Table 4, Balanced Panel, Random Effects Logistic Regresions of Poverty Status
PS Model I
Variables
Coef. Std. Err.
Foreign Remittance
-0.036
0.249
Foreign remittance excluding from India
Foreign remittance from India
Amount of foreign remittance (in 2011 values)
Caste and ethnicity (ref.=upper caste Hindus)
Middle caste Hindu
0.209
0.245
Low Caste Hindu
0.408
0.255
Newar
0.344
0.382
Janajati
0.664
0.199 ***
Muslim and others
0.089
0.383
Urban areas
-1.133
0.366 ***
Development region (ref.=eastern)
Central
0.331
0.191 *
Western
-0.226
0.230
Mid-western
-0.041
0.265
Far-western
1.018
0.316 ***
Econological belt (ref.=mountains)
Hills
0.605
0.243 **
Terai
-0.092
0.236
Household size
-0.014
0.052
# of HH members under 18
0.163
0.074 **
HH head--Sex: Female
0.012
0.222
HH head--Age
-0.021
0.031
HH head--Age squared
<0.000 <0.000
HH head--Can read
0.142
0.170
HH head--Education
-0.060
0.024 **
HH head--Marital status (ref.=married)
Widowed/divorced/separated
0.253
0.236
Never married
0.483
0.633
HH Head--Occupation (ref.=others)
Administrative, Professional & Technical
-0.490
0.422
Sales
0.131
0.339
Agriculture & Forestry
0.247
0.210
Production
-0.305
0.298
Property per capita (Log)
-0.348
0.055 ***
_Constant
3.180
0.970 ***
Fraction of poor and non-poor accurately predicted
0.671
Note: * P < 0.10; ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01

PS Model II
Coef. Std. Err.
-0.816
0.313

PS Model III
Coef. Std. Err.

0.455 *
0.300
<-0.001

<0.001

0.206
0.446
0.345
0.695
0.126
-1.138

0.245
0.256 *
0.383
0.200 ***
0.382
0.367 ***

0.219
0.406
0.320
0.660
0.140
-1.114

0.246
0.255
0.382
0.199 ***
0.384
0.367 ***

0.329
-0.242
-0.051
1.008

0.191 *
0.230
0.265
0.316 ***

0.334
-0.221
-0.053
1.006

0.191 *
0.230
0.265
0.316 ***

0.625
-0.086
-0.013
0.164
0.001
-0.019
<0.000
0.128
-0.059

0.243 ***
0.236
0.052
0.074 **
0.223
0.031
<0.000
0.170
0.024 **

0.604
-0.092
-0.012
0.166
0.047
-0.020
<0.000
0.123
-0.059

0.243 **
0.237
0.052
0.074 **
0.223
0.031
<0.000
0.170
0.024 **

0.227
0.480

0.237
0.633

0.260
0.472
-0.469
0.144
0.261
-0.285
-0.341
3.041
0.669

0.237
0.636
0.422
0.340
0.210
0.298
0.055 ***
0.971 ***

-0.499
0.129
0.253
-0.291
-0.344
3.080
0.674

0.421
0.339
0.210
0.298
0.055 ***
0.972 ***
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Table 5, Balanced Panel, Random Effects (MLE) Regressions of Non-poverty Level (unweighted)
NPL Model I
NPL Model II
NPL Model III
Variables
Coef. Std. Err.
Coef. Std. Err.
Coef. Std. Err.
Foreign Remittance
111.714 64.642 *
Foreign remittance excluding from India
326.786 106.475 ***
Foreign remittance from India
-2.101 78.539
Amount of foreign remittance (in 2011 values)
0.004 <0.001 ***
Caste and ethnicity (ref.=upper caste Hindus)
Middle caste Hindu
38.422 60.242
41.467 60.105
-1.494 50.047
Low Caste Hindu
67.927 62.752
57.909 62.722
18.921 52.143
Newar
-103.982 81.071
-94.724 80.954
-35.726 67.266
Janajati
57.145 48.498
49.786 48.465
2.360 40.317
Muslim and others
-6.434 96.932
-13.322 96.731
-61.939 80.508
Urban areas
410.064 76.930 *** 404.019 76.777 *** 273.886 64.120 ***
Development region (ref.=eastern)
Central
-31.795 46.810
-29.228 46.705
-16.422 38.839
Western
91.486 56.200
97.071 56.105 *
62.957 46.598
Mid-western
-32.637 66.814
-28.826 66.666
-9.591 55.479
Far-western
-80.003 75.935
-75.768 75.766
-47.605 63.065
Econological belt (ref.=mountains)
Hills
-23.061 60.374
-28.891 60.269
-18.715 50.130
Terai
22.415 59.407
19.685 59.271
32.491 49.322
Household size
-3.580 13.299
-3.600 13.266
-7.373 11.034
# of HH members under 18
-7.894 18.734
-7.952 18.688
-3.774 15.555
HH head--Sex: Female
-3.917 56.078
2.221 55.992
-93.716 46.597 **
HH head--Age
-4.100
8.005
-4.365
7.986
4.254
6.656
HH head--Age squared
0.003
0.079
0.006
0.079
-0.072
0.066
HH head--Can read
-16.460 44.552
-12.732 44.467
-11.657 36.804
HH head--Education
0.891
5.585
0.445
5.574
-3.169
4.638
HH head--Marital status (ref.=married)
Widowed/divorced/separated
-59.883 60.407
-63.542 60.275
-17.715 50.088
Never married
419.623 150.687 *** 426.927 150.343 *** 505.826 125.164 ***
HH Head--Occupation (ref.=others)
Administrative, Professional & Technical
42.564 89.216
37.298 89.020
66.934 74.025
Sales
-28.853 81.004
-34.218 80.832
-22.494 67.254
Agriculture & Forestry
-11.128 53.295
-15.765 53.195
-53.378 44.286
Production
-99.033 73.868
-103.775 73.709
-131.472 61.347 **
Property per capita (Log)
77.980 12.895 *** 75.020 12.916 *** 69.858 10.709 ***
_Constant
-455.094 246.117 * -415.770 245.998 * -418.916 204.338 **
LR Chi-Sq
174
180
658
DF
27
28
27
P>Chi-Sq
0
0
0
Note: * P < 0.10; ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01
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Table 6, Balanced Panel, Random Effects (MLE) Regressions of Non-poverty Level (weighted for attrition bias)
NPL Model IV
NPL Model V
NPL Model VI
Variables
Coef. Std. Err.
Coef. Std. Err.
Coef. Std. Err.
Foreign Remittance
147.229 61.605 **
Foreign remittance excluding from India
446.122 101.807 ***
Foreign remittance from India
-8.036 74.443
Amount of foreign remittance (in 2011 values)
0.005 <0.001 ***
Caste and ethnicity (ref.=upper caste Hindus)
Middle caste Hindu
49.885 54.516
55.343 54.278
-2.173 41.814
Low Caste Hindu
87.904 63.113
75.182 62.909
20.675 48.415
Newar
-118.958 82.245
-105.530 81.938
-18.799 63.025
Janajati
84.436 47.680 *
74.211 47.536
4.329 36.618
Muslim and others
2.953 91.774
-7.048 91.381
-49.354 70.350
Urban areas
475.266 76.552 *** 466.869 76.224 *** 274.477 59.007 ***
Development region (ref.=eastern)
Central
-47.103 45.155
-42.816 44.957
-28.706 34.566
Western
101.789 55.589 *
109.889 55.370 **
54.471 42.551
Mid-western
-33.735 64.461
-28.805 64.170
-12.455 49.402
Far-western
-87.466 72.947
-81.393 72.621
-53.160 55.917
Econological belt (ref.=mountains)
Hills
-28.836 57.349
-36.699 57.118
-23.114 43.950
Terai
18.785 56.588
15.339 56.328
33.835 43.359
Household size
-5.531 12.759
-5.378 12.699
-9.139
9.774
# of HH members under 18
-6.851 18.013
-7.353 17.928
-2.190 13.805
HH head--Sex: Female
21.448 54.762
28.859 54.540
-90.348 42.032 **
HH head--Age
-7.351
7.911
-7.519
7.874
4.478
6.075
HH head--Age squared
0.036
0.079
0.039
0.078
-0.070
0.061
HH head--Can read
-15.829 43.260
-9.930 43.085
-11.724 32.984
HH head--Education
5.069
5.454
4.488
5.430
-0.045
4.181
HH head--Marital status (ref.=married)
Widowed/divorced/separated
-59.025 58.378
-64.756 58.122
-9.418 44.693
Never married
395.869 163.169 ** 407.841 162.430 ** 509.633 125.096 ***
HH Head--Occupation (ref.=others)
Administrative, Professional & Technical
52.237 88.839
43.935 88.448
77.620 68.026
Sales
-22.963 81.936
-32.664 81.592
-23.010 62.788
Agriculture & Forestry
18.627 53.778
11.197 53.562
-45.585 41.265
Production
-76.161 73.507
-85.003 73.198
-117.118 56.351 **
Property per capita (Log)
75.726 12.653 *** 71.424 12.648 *** 64.368
9.701 ***
_Constant
-420.818 239.786 * -368.549 239.075
-381.321 183.753 **
LR Chi-Sq
194
208
941
DF
27
28
27
P>Chi-Sq
0
0
0
Note: * P < 0.10; ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01
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Table 7, Balanced Panel, Random Effects Regressions of Non-poverty Level and Poverty Status
(with adjustment for heterogeneity bias)
NPL Model VII
PS Model IV
Variables
Coef. Std. Err.
Coef. Std. Err.
Annual average foreign remittance, NRS
0.004 <0.001 ***
<-0.001 <0.001
Mean differenced foreign remittance, NRS
0.006 <0.001 ***
<-0.001 <0.001 ***
Caste and ethnicity (ref.=upper caste Hindus)
Middle caste Hindu
20.889 49.913
0.062
0.255
Low Caste Hindu
45.984 52.094
0.239
0.265
Newar
-27.248 66.778
0.248
0.396
Janajati
18.891 40.178
0.575
0.206 ***
Muslim and others
-36.031 80.100
-0.041
0.397
Urban areas
257.959 63.728 ***
-1.031
0.378 ***
Development region (ref.=eastern)
Central
-15.807 38.542
0.344
0.198 *
Western
60.297 46.245
-0.219
0.238
Mid-western
-0.172 55.095
-0.091
0.274
Far-western
-45.225 62.585
1.055
0.328 ***
Econological belt (ref.=mountains)
Hills
-28.522 49.795
0.688
0.253 ***
Terai
26.366 48.964
-0.053
0.245
Household size
-8.929 10.955
-0.002
0.054
# of HH members under 18
-4.554 15.436
0.173
0.076 **
HH head--Sex: Female
-72.593 46.479
-0.114
0.231
HH head--Age
5.469
6.610
-0.032
0.032
HH head--Age squared
-0.077
0.065
0.000
0.000
HH head--Can read
79.307 41.765 *
-0.460
0.204 **
HH head--Education
-7.282
4.693
-0.035
0.024
HH head--Marital status (ref.=married)
Widowed/divorced/separated
-24.822 49.730
0.280
0.242
Never married
503.034 124.207 ***
0.517
0.668
HH Head--Occupation (ref.=others)
Administrative, Professional & Technical
71.669 73.466
-0.518
0.428
Sales
-18.207 66.746
0.095
0.346
Agriculture & Forestry
-51.825 43.949
0.244
0.215
Production
-126.564 60.887 **
-0.351
0.306
Property per capita (Log)
82.580 10.998 ***
-0.428
0.060 ***
_Constant
-806.874 220.415 ***
5.651
1.119 ***
LR or Wald Chi-Sq
678
170
DF
28
28
P>Chi-Sq
0
0
Note: * P < 0.10; ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01

Table 8, Binder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Non-poverty Level by Remittance Status
% Difference in
Variation Explained
by Characteristics
With foreign remittance
55.524
With foreign remittance from India
50.587
With foreign remittance from countries other than India
51.630
Remittance Status

% Difference in
Variation Explained
by Remittance Status
44.476
49.413
48.370
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